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7' VIETNAM 
, "d t Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. PreSl en , ac-
cording to press reports, the Vietcong 
has offered 13 days of truce, spreading 
over Christmas, the New Year and Tet-
the Asian lunar New Year. It accepted, 
there would be, presumably, a 3-day 
cease-fire at Christmas, a 3-day 
cease-fire at New Year, and a 7-day sus-
pension of hostilities at Tet. The chances 
that the 13-day series of pauses will be 
long enough to achieve a plausible re-
sponse are very, very, very remote. 
The announcement came from the 
clandestine radio of the National Libera-
tion Front in South Vietnam. This would 
seem to support the belief that the main 
factor to be considered in South Vietnam 
1s nqt Hanoi but the National Liberation 
Fron~ and tbe Vletrong of the South. 
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In line with his campaign promise, 
President Thieu has also indicated, ap-
parently, that possibly later this month 
he would dispatch a Jetter to Hanoi seek-
ing to inaugurate negotiations between 
Saigon and North Vietnam. In my opin-
ion, the move will be foredoomed to fail-
ure. It would seem to me to be far more 
advisable for Saigon to dispatch a com-
munication to the National Liberation 
Front for the purpose of entering into 
negotiations that might lead to a settle-
ment in South Vietnam. If direct com-
munication is not possible then, perhaps, 
a message might go by way of an Inter-
mediary such as Prince Norodom Si-
hanouk of Cambodia. 
The National Liberation Front is the 
dominant force In South Vietnam, with 
a total of main forces and paramilitary 
forces numbering in excess of a quarter 
million men. This, of course, is exclusive 
of the some 50,000 North Vietnamese reg-
ulars, out of a total of 470,000 men in the 
North Vietnam Army, who are now lo-
cated in South Vietnam. 
In my opinion, there is very little, if 
anything, in the pattern of combat oper-
ations to indicate any weakening of the 
ability of the Vietcong to keep on fight-
ing. They are in no position to and con-
not prevent the steady consolidation of 
American forces along the coast and 
among the major cities, but they still con-
trol the Mekong Delta as I will bring out 
lE.ter in my remarks. 
It would be well to consider that our 
original Intent in relation to South VIet-
nam was to maintain its integrity and 
Its inqependence. I would asswne that in 
that context, all the people of South 
Vietnam would be included. Undoubtedly, 
the North Vietnamese have been hurt, 
and hurt badly, by our bombing raids 
against their territory, but it is evident 
by now that the three objectives of the 
bombing of the north, to wit, to restore 
the morale of the South Vietnamese 
people, to decrease the rate of Infiltra-
tion, and to force Hanoi to the confer-
ence table have not been successfully 
achieved. While the morale of the South 
Vietnamese Government may have been 
restored, the factor of the morale of the 
people of South Vietnam is another mat-
ter; insofar as infiltration from the north 
Is concerned, it Is still continuing at the 
rate of 6,500 to 7,000 a month ; and as for 
bringing Hanoi to the conference table, 
the distance is, in my opinion, wider than 
ever. Therefore, it appears to me that in 
line with our original commitment, it 
would be well to consolidate and concen-
trate in South Vietnam itself and for the 
Saigon Government to try to establish 
t~ontact with the National Liberation 
Front. In this manner, all of the Viet-
namese who live In South Vietnam will 
be represented. Perhaps among them-
selves they can come up with a solution 
which would be preferable to our con-
tinuous and fruitless appeals to Hanoi 
for negotiations and to the Soviet Union 
for a reconvening of the Geneva Confer-
ence. 
In relation to South Vietnam, the Me-
kong Delta, which is the stronghold of 
the NLF and the Vietcong, has hardly 
been touched. In that area lie 80 percent 
of the farmland and around 7 m!llion or 
approximately one-half of the popula-
tion of South Vietnam. The Vietcong has 
an extensive organization there and Is, 
for many of the people who Inhabit the 
area, the sole Vietnamese Government 
they have ever known, trusted, or feared. 
The Mekong Delta has been the strong-
hold of the Vietcong for over 20 years, 
and It knows every aspect of guerrilla 
warfare which can be used in that re-
gion. To the best of my knowledge, no 
North Vietnamese regulars have been 
found in the Mekong Delta. It is Jhy un-
derstanding that the Vietcong have, at 
the present time, something In t he order 
of 22 well-trained battalions and, in ad-
dition, there are guerr!lla forces there 
which would bring the total In the Delta 
to somewhere in the vicinity of 85,000 
armed men. Opposed to them, there are 
several South Vietnamese divisions and, 
according to the public prints, there are 
elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Di-
vision In that area. 
I cite these facts and figures to indi-
cate that the main area of conflict is not 
North Vietnam but South Vietnam In-
sofar as the number of armed Vietcong 
and North Vietnamese is concerned, the 
total is approximately the same as this 
time last year While much of the pub-
licity goes to the bombing of the north 
and related activities. the real and most 
vitalllrea of contention is in South Viet-
nam itself. 
Almost every possible procedure has 
b en suggested to bring this conflict to a 
close by advancing negotiating proposals 
such as a guaranteed neutrality of all of 
Southeast Asia, the Cooper proposal 
to concentrate the bombing on the Ho 
Chi Minh trails at the crossing of the 
17th parallel. the building of a barrier 
just south of that parallel, a return to 
the Geneva Conference and Its agree-
ment.~ and many others, all of which I 
approve of but all of which to thi• time 
have proven fruitless. 
Perhaps the answer lies within South 
Vietnam Itself. P erhaps nel(ot!aUon be-
tween Saigon and the Vietcong might 
pnive fruitful Certainly this is one possl-
b!l!ty which has not been recognized, 
except Intermittently and haphazardly. 
Like the man who looked for diamonds 
all over the world and late in life found 
them In his own backyard, it Is po.ssible 
that In South Vietnam itsrlf the solution 
to this war could be fow1d. 
We should not delude oursrlves by such 
phrases as a "phase-down" of the level 
of American troops by 1969 to be matched 
by an Increasing shift of responsibility 
to the South Vietnamese forces. Rather 
we should face up to the very strong pos-
sibility that the war In Vietnam may well 
take years and require, as it has hereto-
fore required, additional inputs of Amer-
Ican forces unless a solution Is fow1d to 
bring it to a conclusion 
Every effort toward negotiations must 
continue to be made. Every avenue must 
be explored to the end that this war In 
which we are engaged 8,000 miles away 
from the United States can be con-
cluded honorably and our men with-
drawn at the first feasible opportunity. 
We are not an Asian power. Our Interests 
do not lie on the Asian mainland. We are 
a Pacific power with peripheral Interests 
in Asia. The distinction is of immense 
importance to the future of this Nation. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, w111 the 
Senator from Montana yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am happy to yield 
to the Senator from Vermont. 
Mr. AIKEN. I am sure that what the 
Senator from Montana has Just said -wlll 
be of great Interest not only to Congress 
and the people of the United States but 
to the rest of the world as well. 
His remarks are certainly worthy of 
consideration wherever listeners or read-
ers may be foWld. 
I was very much Interested, in listen-
Ing to top fiight omcials on television 
and radio these past 3 or 4 days learn 
that they have abandoned efforts to 
cover up the probable duraLion of the 
war, to which we have listened for the 
past 3 or 4 years. 
I well remember when we were told 
that if only we would drop bombs on 
North Vietnam it would be a matter of 
only a short time before the enemy would 
respond favorably and ask for a confer-
ence. In fact, one retired Air Force gen-
eral intimated that it would only take a 
few days. Others not so optimistic spoke 
in terms of weeks or a few months. 
Now, however, General Westmoreland, 
who is as cognizant of the situation as 
anyone can be, said that we may hope 
for improvement and perhaps some de-
escalation In 2 years 
I personally believe he is optimistic 
The Senator from Montana !Mr. MANS-
FIELD] has been referring to the situation 
in the delta, which our admimstration 
would rather not talk about, apparently. 
What resources there may be on the delta 
or offshore, besides rice, I am unable to 
say, but it is apparent to all of us that 
the delta Is an extremely Important part 
of South Vietnam. South Vietnam is now 
run in Saigon omcially by a government 
which was supported by 35 percent of 
the voters of South Vietnam and the U 1:. 
Government. I would hardly call that a 
maJority rule. 
But what concerns me most, Mr. Presi-
dent, is that while we are focusmg at-
tention on Southeast Asia, we are really 
nealecting the situation here at home; 
and I believe it is in the United States 
that our greatest danger from totalitari-
anism. whether from the right or the 
left, lies. 
I hope that the administration wlll 
face up to the situation, which they have 
not done so far. We hear rwnors. We 
hear rwnors of a very substantial In-
crease in the number of our Armed 
Forces next year. So far as I know, they 
are merely rwnors; but if there is such 
an Increase, Is this Increase to be used 
In Asia? Is It to be used at election time 
In the United States, guarding the polls, 
as was done, theoretically at least, in 
Gary, Ind., this year? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time 
of the Senator has expired. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
ask Wlan!mous consent to proceed for ,3 
additional minutes. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, It Is so ordered. 
Mr. AIKEN. We also hear rumors that 
the administration may request some 
rather drastic nlles and regulations, 
which go with the conduct of a major 
war here In the United States, some-
time within the coming year. If thry do, 
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it will be recognition of a very serious 
situation which exists here. 
In this respect, Mr. President, on Jan-
uary 31, 1966, I spoke on this floor call-
ing attention to the situation which 
existed then, and expressed the hope, 
and actually the belief, that the admin-
istration would do something about it. 
I said this at that time: 
From now on our No. 1 concern must be 
the preservation of the United States and 
lts lnstltutlons. 
A little later in this speech I said: 
I! President Johii..son means business-and 
I belleve he does-
I really believed if~ 
he wlll ask !or the suspension of the Gen-
eral Tax Reduction Act of 2 years ago. 
He wtll ask to have the loopholes of over-
generous deductions a.nd specla.J tax priv-
Ileges plugged. 
And he wlll ask for such new taxes as may 
be necessary. 
There ls no sense In waiting untU after 
election to recommend the lnevlta.ble. 
Lives are more precious than votes. 
He is now asking for a tax increase. I 
certainly believe that is necessary if we 
are to fully protect the economy of the 
United States. But even though Congress 
should grant the 10-percent tax rate in-
crease which he asked for, it would only 
go a small way toward doing what he 
said he wm do with the 10-percent tax 
increase. It is hopelessly inadequate, the 
way things are going now, unless it is in 
conjunction with other distasteful war 
measures such as price and wage con-
trols--material allocations, and so on. 
I ask unanimous consent to insert in 
the RECORD at this point the speech I 
made on the floor January 31, 1966. 
There being no objection, the speech 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Jan. 31, 
1966[ 
THt:: RESUMPTION OF BOMBING IN VIETNAM. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President. President John-
son has now directed a renewal and possible 
Increase In the bombing of North Vietnam. 
Under the constitutional and statutory 
powers vested In the Presidency he has 
authority to do this. 
Even I! 90 percent of the American peo-
ple were opposed, he would stlll have this 
power. 
Now that the decision has been made 
to engage In an expanded Inllltary ac-
tion which may ultimately lead to a conflict 
of unprecedented and unll..o1lted proportions. 
we must spare n o effort to a void defeat and 
to hold our losses to a minimum. 
Although the Communist countries ap-
parently gave little credence to the recent 
peace offensive of the President, there Is 
no question In my mind that President 
Johnson did earnestly desire to put an end 
to the war In southeast Asia. 
Any person ln his position wants to be 
llked and admired as well as to earn a good 
sp<)t In history. 
He wants to be highly respected by the 
rest of the world and. as President Elsen-
hower so ably demonstrated In 1953, the 
surest way to popular acclaim Is through 
the restoration of peace. 
President Eisenhower further enhanced hls 
populan ty >Lnd secured an en viable place In 
history when he backed Gen. Matthew Ridg-
way ln his opposition to sending large num-
bers of US. troops Into Vietnam In an effort 
to make secure that part or their colonial 
empire for the French. 
Since we now seem to have po.ssed the 
point of no return, we should take a good, 
hard look at the situation as It Is today. 
The number o! U.S. servicemen supporting. 
the South VIetnamese Government has now 
Increased te about 200,000, will be doubled 
within the next few months, and It will 
likely be redoubled within the next year. 
This figure Is exclusive of the Navy and 
other forces based at Guam. In the Phlllp-
plnes, In Thalland, In Honolulu, and else-
where. 
It Is exclusive of the 16,000 to 18,000 South 
Korean troops engaged In the conJllct, 
Aside from the forces !rom South Korea 
and Australia, we can look tor only minor 
assistance from other countries In our Viet-
nam efforts. 
In !act, 1! South Korea Is now being In-
filtrated by Communist operators to the ex-
tent recently Indicated by Marine Gen. Wal-
lace Greene, It Is unlikely that we can look 
tor any substantial Increase In our strength 
from that source. 
Most of the land area In South VIetnam 
has come under Vietcong control, while U.S. 
bases are all virtually under a state o! siege--
an unorthodox siege, It ls true. but neverthe-
less. one effective enough so that It Is hardly 
sate to venture outside the fortified areas 
except In force. 
Our forces have to date suffered approxi-
mately 10,000 casualties. 
Some who a year ago supported the de-
cision to bomb North Vietnam now feel 
that the reason \his operation !alled Is 
that It has not been vigorous enough. 
They now Insist that Hanoi and Haiphong 
Harbor and other than strictly mllltary 
targets be also bombed. 
Some substantial and respected persons 
have advocated the use of atom bombs--
small ones, that ls. The other day a repre-
sentative of a respected and well-known 
national organization came to my office to 
urge the use of atom bombs In the VIetnam 
war. The demand that we use atomic weap-
ons will Increase as our casualty lists grow. 
Regardless o! the !act that an atom bomb 
could not dlstlngulsh between belllgerents 
and nonbelllgerents, Is there any reason to 
doubt that. should we use the atomic 
weapon against North Vietnam, that the 
Communists would almost at once retaliate 
by using the same type of weapon against 
our air .and Inllltary bases In the south? 
We should think long and hard before 
resorting to nuclear weapons In southeast 
Asia. 
We are now at the point where we pave 
to deal with reo.lltles, not desires. 
It Is no longer possible for us un!laterally 
to call the shots. 
It Is not what might have leen or what 
ought to be that now concerns us. It 1.8 
what ls. 
As Indicated by the Mansfield mission re-
port, there Is "only the very sllm prospect 
ot a just settlement by negotiations." 
Since much or the world has regarded the 
bombing of North Vietnam as "aggression" 
by the United States and since the assistance 
by the North VIetnamese to the Vietcong In 
carrying out their savage operations against 
the people of South Vietnam have been min-
Imized, I belleve that the President's peace 
offensive was necessary even though lts ef-
fectiveness as a means !or ending the war 
may be questioned. 
It seems to have convinced some nations 
ot the justice of our assistance to South 
Vietnam, even though they are unable or un-
willing to assist us. 
Who Is making the decisions ln southeast 
Asla today? Is It Russia or China? 
The reaction of Russia to the President's 
plea for peace has been particula rly dlsap-
polntlng. 
From her attitude one might well con-
clude that Russia not only does not desire 
peace but actuall_v seeks to encourage a. 
greater war In southeast Asia, evidently 
hop\ng that we wlll concentrate such a large 
part o! our Armed Forces there that the de-
fense of democracy w!ll be weakened In 
other parts of the world. 
Or Is China undertaking to shape events 
so that the two great nuclear states wlll ul-
timately destroy each other, leaving the Chi-
nese Republlc the dominant power In world 
atralrs? 
Actually the tiny nation of North Viet-
nam appears to be the catalyst which Is 
wt!ldlng the two great Communist nations 
together tor mUltary purposes. 
I trust that those who make the decisions 
tor our country wlll bear In mind that whlle 
the war or democracy versus communism 
cannot be won In southeast Asia, It can be 
lost there. 
In fact, communism will not be defeated 
on the battlefield anyway except on the 
battlefield o! men's Inlnds. 
U any phase or the con!l.let between these 
two Ideologies must be !ought with a.rm.s, we 
should not let our enernles chooee the 
battleground. 
From now on our No. 1 ooncern must be 
the preservation of the United Bt&te. and Its 
Institutions. 
There can be no halfhearted effort In this 
respect. 
Our people, regardless o! whether or not 
they support the acts of this adm.lnlstratlon, 
must be prepared for extraordinary sacrifice. 
Mr. MANSP'II:LD. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the dlstlngulahed Senator 
!rom Vermont may have as much time as he 
ma.y desire, and that the ttme be extended to 
allow other Senators to participate In dis-
cussing thls moot momentous speech. 
Mr. AIKEN. I thank the majority leader. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, It Is so ordered. 
Mr. Anu:N. Mr. Preslden t, this sacrifice will 
have to be pald ln terms of resources, free-
dom, and life Itself. 
There may be a chance that a world 
nuclear war can be avoided. 
There may be a c.hanoe that we may escape 
the devastating effect of a general land war 
In Asla, tire klnd or war we are least likely 
towln. 
We cannot proceed on the hope for 
miracles, however, therefore, we must be 
prepared !or the worat---.md without delay. 
President Johnson has asked !or some •Is 
bllllon w1 th which to Increase the tempo or 
the war ln Vietnam. • 
Thls $13 bllllon Is only the first drop In 
the bucket. 
Commonsense and experience should tell 
us that. 
The President asks us to rescind the tax cut 
on telephone charges and automobUes 1n 
order to help to meet thls cost. 
It Is ridiculous to expect that the Income 
!rom these recisions would even begin to pay 
the cost of an escalated war. 
If Preslden t Johnson means buslness--{lnd 
I believe he does--he will ask !or the suspen-
sion of the General Tax Reduction Act or 2 
years ago. 
He wlll ask to have the loopholes of over-
generous deductions and special tax privi-
leges plugged. 
And he wUl ask !or such new tsxes a.s may 
be necessary. 
There Is no sense ln waiting untll after 
election to recommend the Inevitable. 
Ll ves are more precious than votes. 
Secretary or Defense McNamara asks !or an 
Increase of 113,000 men ln the Armed Forces. 
Whom does he think he Is klddlng? 
Winning a guerllla war requires a ratio of 
10 to 1 on the side or the law, and the 
enemy already has 200.000 men ln the field. 
The Secretary knows that an escalated war 
wlll require universal conscription. 
To walt untll after election to announce 
this ls just ~other attempt to lull the 
people. 
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Besides Increased taxation and conscrip-
tion, we must be prepared to accept the con-
centration of powers and restrictions on our 
liberties which Inevitably accompany any 
major war. 
We must be prepared to accept these con-
trols for an Indefinite number of years. 
Are we ready to accept a system of pri-
orities-price controls and wage controls? 
What about ration cards? 
Are we prepared to control hoarding which 
may already be underway? 
Are our shelters adequate to Insure the 
perpetuation of at least a part of our pop-
ulation In the event of a nuclear war? 
Have we the fac111tles necessary for the 
control of sabotage, subversion, riots, and 
criminal law vlolattons? 
We do not like to contemplate these 
things; yet they must be considered and 
acted upon unless the danger Is far less 
than It now appears. 
Tills time we cannot walt until catas-
trophe strikes. 
So long as there Is the sllgh test chance 
!or pence, we should pursue It, even whlle 
preparing !or the worst, but we must 
prepare. 
Since the VIetnam war began to escalate 
rapidly 3 years ago, I have repeatedly tried 
to make clear my belle! that a major war 
would have disastrous results !or the United 
States either mllltarlly or In the loss o! 
personal liberty at home. 
Although I have at all times r~col';nlzod 
the responsibilities of the United States 
to the P<<>plc or South VIetnam, I never for 
an Ins taut regarded my vote !or the concur-
rent resqlut<on of August 1964 as a vote to 
give the Prebldent authority to wage war at 
will In southeast Asia. 
I opposed as strongly as I could the start 
of a new war In North VIetnam. 
And I believe the Preslden t has erred In 
taking new steps which may lead to a 
cataclysmic world conflict. 
It appears, however, that my voice has 
been Ineffective and that the President has 
decided to take such steps. 
Tile most that Is left to me now Is the 
hope that the President Is right and that 
I have been wrong. 
If, through the renewed action for which 
he assumes responslbUity, the war can be 
brought to a quick and satisfactory ending, 
I will gladly admit the error of my judgment 
and be among the first to render him 
acclaim. 
To this end. It Is my purpose to support 
his request !or higher taxes and for such 
co.'ltrols over the American economy as may 
seem necessary to hold our losses to a mini-
mum and to enhance the prospects for ulti-
mate victory. 
To divide our Nation In this time or crisis 
would be to court certain disaster. 
Mr. AIKEN. I will say in explanation 
that my last sentence was this: 
To divide our Nation In this time or crisis 
would be to court certain disaster. 
Mr. President, I want to make It plain 
that I was referring to the economic 
situation and the security of our Nation 
and did not in any way mean to imply 
that we should unanimously approve all 
the decisions, all the mistakes, which the 
administration might see fit to make or 
had made up to that time. But we are 
1n a situation now where one could al-
most believe that Russia had been call-
Ing the shots for the purpose of putting 
us in as disadvantageous a position as 
possible. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time 
of the Senator has expired. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous 
consent to proceed for 2 additional min-
utes. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
obJection, it is so ordered. 
Mr. AIKEN. Yesterday Hanoi radio 
claimed they shot down 17 of our planes. 
I expect that this claim will be disputed. 
It may be exaggerated. It probably is. It 
will probably be disputed by our own 
Armed Forces. But only Saturday we 
were told officially that the number of 
planes shot down over North Vietnam 
was 1,700-some-odd, which in itself 
shows what a serious situation we are ln. 
May I again say, let us not forget that 
the real danger to our democratic in-
stitutions lies in the United States, and 
not 10,000 miles away_ If we come under 
the control of a totalita1ian government, 
whether from the right or the left--and 
as far as effect goes, there Is very little 
difference-it will be brought about by 
conditions at home rather than condi-
tions which may exist 10,000 or 12,000 
miles away. 
As the Senator from Montana says 
very truly, we should not plan to run 
Asia. We are not an Asian power. We are 
a Pacific power. We wlll remain a Pacific 
power as long as we take care of our 
country here at home. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distin-
guished Senator, who always has added 
much to anyone's speech. He always adds 
much to think about, much to cogitate 
about, and much to consider. / 
\ 
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